Unemployment insurance savings accounts in Latin America : overview and assessment by Ferrer, Ana M. & Riddell, W. Craig
Summary Findings
The unemployment protection systems that exist in most Latin American economies are generally 
considered inadequate in terms of providing insurance to workers. They may also encourage 
stratified labor markets and impose barriers to the employee’s mobility and the firm’s adjustment to 
changing labor market conditions. In addition, some of these systems involve high administrative 
and monitoring costs and may create additional adverse effects that induce higher unemployment 
rates and longer duration of unemployment and promote informal labor markets. Recently, 
research effort and policy interest has turned to Unemployment Insurance Savings Accounts 
(UISAs) as an alternative to traditional systems of unemployment insurance. UISAs are schemes 
of individual mandatory savings. Therefore, they smooth income over an individual’s life cycle 
time rather than pooling unemployment risk over the total working population at a point in time. 
This form of unemployment insurance diminishes the moral hazard problems associated with 
traditional insurance methods. However, it presents problems of its own. First, it is questionable 
that these systems provide adequate protection against unemployment risk. Additionally, their 
effects on the promotion of informal labor markets and their administrative costs are yet to be 
determined. Finally, the effectiveness as a form of unemployment insurance depends critically 
upon the performance and credibility of the financial institutions managing the funds. This paper 
examines the experience of Latin American countries that use UISAs, with the hope of highlighting 
the problems of the system and identifying areas for future theoretical and empirical work. In 
conclusion, the overall effect of UISAs depends on a vast array of specific country characteristics 
and program parameters. The way the system is implemented, existing labor regulation, the extent 
of the informal economy and the scope for collusive behavior greatly influence the success of 
these programs. This calls for a more extensive research effort in the area.
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The unemployment protection systems that exist in most Latin American economies are 
generally considered inadequate in terms of providing insurance to workers. They may also 
encourage stratified labor markets and impose barriers to the employee's mobility and the 
firm's adjustment to changing labor market conditions. In addition, some of these systems 
involve high administrative and monitoring costs and may create additional adverse effects 
that induce higher unemployment rates and longer duration of unemployment and promote 
informal labor markets. Recently, research effort and policy interest has turned to 
Unemployment Insurance Savings Accounts (UISAs) as an alternative to traditional systems 
of unemployment insurance. UISAs are schemes of individual mandatory savings. Therefore, 
they smooth income over an individual's life cycle time rather than pooling unemployment 
risk over the total working population at a point in time. This form of unemployment 
insurance diminishes the moral hazard problems associated with traditional insurance 
methods. However, it presents problems of its own. First, it is questionable that these systems 
provide adequate protection against unemployment risk. Additionally, their effects on the 
promotion of informal labor markets and their administrative costs are yet to be determined. 
Finally, the effectiveness as a form of unemployment insurance depends critically upon the 
performance and credibility of the financial institutions managing the funds. This paper 
examines the experience of Latin American countries that use UISAs, with the hope of 
highlighting the problems of the system and identifying areas for future theoretical  and 
empirical work. In conclusion, the overall effect of UISAs depends on a vast array of specific 
country characteristics and program parameters. The way the system is implemented, 
existing labor regulation, the extent of the informal economy and the scope for collusive 
behavior greatly influence the success of these programs. This calls for a more extensive 
research effort in the area.  
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Unemployment Insurance Savings Accounts in Latin America: 
Overview and Assessment 
 





A variety of economic shocks have hit Latin American countries since the end of the 
1990's. The effects of these shocks upon the labor market have been severe and have re-
awakened a long standing debate between the need for employment stability and the need for 
flexible labor markets. For firms, extensive labor regulation implies a costly adjustment to 
economic changes, loss of competitiveness and slower economic recoveries.
1
Many Latin American countries seek in labour market flexibility a way out of the 
current financial difficulties. In these circumstances, providing adequate income support for 
the affected workers becomes most important. Traditionally, most Latin American countries 
have protected the unemployed through a combination of high severance payments and/or 
low unemployment insurance or subsidies. Both theoretical and empirical research shows 
that these systems offer low coverage, benefit workers from the formal sector only, impede 
labor mobility and technological adjustment by the firms, and provide incentives for the 
creation of informal job relations.
 On the other 
hand, in the absence of adequate mechanisms of income support, flexible labour markets 
leave workers unprotected to face economic downturns. Additionally, poor labor stability 
may have undesirable effects on human capital accumulation and labor productivity.  
2
                                                            
*The authors, Ana M. Ferrer, Department of Economics, University of British Columbia and W. Craig Riddell, 
Department of Economics, University of British Columbia would like to thank Milan Vodopivec and a referee 
for their comments on an earlier version of this paper. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed 
in this paper are entirely those of the authors.  They do not necessarily represent the view of the World Bank, its 
Executive Directors, or the countries they represent. 
  
 
1 The effects of labor market regulation on various aspects of employment and unemployment in Latin America 
have been studied by Barros and Corseuil (2001), MacIsaac and Rama (2000), Mondino and Montoya (2000), 
Saavedra and Torero (2000), and Marquez and Pages (1998). 
2 See Heckman and Pages (2000), Blanchard (1998), Blondal and Pearson (1995), and Katz and Meyer (1990).     
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The unemployment protection systems that exist in most Latin American economies 
are generally considered inadequate in terms of providing insurance to workers and are prone 
to generate stratified labor markets. Recently, research effort and policy interest has turned to 
Unemployment Insurance Savings Accounts (UISAs) as an alternative to traditional systems 
of unemployment insurance. UISAs are schemes of individual mandatory savings that 
smooth income over an individual's life cycle time rather than pooling unemployment risk 
over the total working population at a point in time. Although this form of unemployment 
insurance diminishes the moral hazard problems associated with traditional insurance 
methods, it presents problems of its own. This paper examines the experience of Latin 
American countries that use UISAs, with the hope of highlighting the problems of the system 
and identifying areas for future theoretical and empirical work. In conclusion, the overall 
effect of UISAs depends on a vast array of specific country characteristics and program 
parameters. The way the system is implemented, existing labor regulation, the extent of the 
informal economy and the scope for collusive behavior greatly influence the success of these 
programs. This calls for a more extensive research effort in the area.  
The paper is organized as follows. Next section discusses the potential advantages of 
UISA’s. Section 3 describes the UISA systems currently in place in Latin America and goes 
on to analyzing some of the issues concerning UISA’s that have arisen in the light of these 
countries’ experiences. Section 4 concludes.  
Potential Advantages of UISA’s 
In the context of the existent high levels of unemployment in most Latin American 
countries, a review of the current and alternative systems of unemployment protection is 
called for. Recently, research effort and policy interest has turned to UISAs as an alternative 
to traditional systems of unemployment insurance. UISAs are schemes of mandatory savings. 
The basic design of these systems is as follows. Workers and/or firms are required to make 
regular deposits to individual accounts. In the event of unemployment, the worker can 
withdraw funds from his account to support the transition toward another job. This system 
has the advantage of making workers internalize the cost of unemployment benefits, hence    
 
3   
avoiding traditional moral hazard problems present in most insurance schemes. In general, 
this system does not affect the incentives for job search as unemployment insurance does. It 
has, however, potential adverse effects that have to be addressed. Theoretical studies by 
Orszag et al. (1999) and Stigliz and Yun (2002) indicate that unless savings accounts are 
comprehensive -- that is, they become pension funds upon retirement -- workers will have 
incentives to withdraw from the labor force before retirement to claim their accumulated 
savings. These studies also suggest that, as long as the various risks faced by a given person 
are not perfectly correlated, integration of the social insurance programs intended to deal 
with these individual risks will also be welfare improving.  
UISA’s have been assessed against more traditional systems of unemployment 
insurance (UI)
3. Because UISA’s are individual accounts, the moral hazard problem present 
in UI programs vanishes. Workers fully internalize the cost of remaining unemployed and 
have greater incentives towards re-employment. This is an important aspect of UISA’s given 
the limited monitoring capacity of developing countries. Because the two systems require 
different degrees of infrastructure, they are generally suitable for economies at different 
levels of development. However, most of the debate over UISA’s focuses on its advantages 
versus severance pay, the most common form of unemployment protection in Latin 
America
4. UISAs do offer some of the same advantages that severance pay does
5
                                                            
3 See Vodopivec and Raju (2002) 
4 See Parsons (2004) for a discussion of the differences between UISA's and Severance Pay income protection 
systems for workers permanently separated from their jobs.  
. Severance 
pay constitutes a lump sum -- the magnitude of which usually depends on job tenure -- 
collected upon job separation. Consequently, it does not affect job search effort. It is also 
unlikely to reduce effort exerted on the job, since misconduct at work often precludes 
severance pay. Therefore, both UISAs and severance pay avoid moral hazard problems on 
the part of the worker. The main difference between both systems, however, is that severance 
pay creates additional moral hazard problems on the part of the firm that are not present in 
UISAs. Because, in the case of severance pay, payments are only made at the end of the labor 
contract, and may reach at the time of liquidation considerable size, firms have incentives to 
try to avoid payment (Kluger, 2001). Additionally, there is not, in general, a legal    
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requirement for the firms to maintain enough reserves to support this obligation. This creates 
liquidity problems when the firms need to make substantial labour adjustments. UISAs, on 
the other hand do not create such incentives/problems because smaller payments are made 
regularly to the individual accounts. Hence, the main advantage of UISAs relative to 
severance pay is to avoid the firm moral hazard problem and to guarantee payments to the 
worker in the event of unemployment. An additional distinction between the two systems is 
that UISAs qualifies as a delayed payment, rather than as a firing cost, which is the case of 
severance pay. This has important consequences in terms of creating a more flexible labor 
relation without lowering income protection. The same incentives that may induce a firm to 
avoid the payment of a large severance package may prevent it from dismissing unproductive 
workers or (formally) hiring additional workers.   
One of the major uncertainties regarding an UISA system concerns its capacity to 
provide sufficient coverage and adequacy of benefits against unemployment risk. Since, in 
the event of unemployment, workers withdraw funds from a personal account rather than 
from a common pool of resources, benefits may not be adequate for individuals who 
experience frequent or long-lasting spells of unemployment. For this reason, UISA systems 
are not usually conceived as the sole form of unemployment protection. Alternatively, they 
may contain additional features such as limits on the withdrawal of funds or government 
contributions to a separate pool of funds, which would alleviate these situations. The most 
common theoretical proposal includes a combination of self-insurance with public insurance. 
In these models, workers may borrow from the government in the event that their own 
unemployment account balance becomes negative. Model simulations seem to offer hope that 
such systems will indeed be viable (Feldstein and Altman, 1998 and Vodopivec and Rejec, 
2001). In line with these models, Chile has implemented a UISA system that also finances, 
through employer and government contributions, a common unemployment fund (Fondo 
Solidario). Chilean workers with insufficient balances in their accounts can borrow against 
the Solidarity Fund.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
5 For an overview of the severance pay system around the world and in Latin America see Holtzman, Iyer and 
Vodopivec (2003) and Jaramillo and Saavedra (2005) in this volume.    
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An additional issue regarding the coverage of UISAs systems arises when we 
consider the extent of the informal economy in many Latin American countries. In general, 
any system that significantly increases the burden of labor costs for employers has the 
potential to promote informal labor contracts (Lozoya, 1996). Theoretically, UISAs are less 
prone than other systems to have this effect, since employers' contributions do not usually 
depend on the length of employment, neither are they necessarily tied to other labor costs. In 
practice, however, it is important to note that the effects will depend on country specific 
issues such as: how the UISA system is  implemented, its cost relative to the previous 
program, and how it interacts with other labor regulations. Therefore, country specific case 
studies are necessary to analyze the effects of UISAs in promoting formal labor contracts.    
Another dimension on which UISAs offer an advantage relative to more traditional systems 
is that they promise to have relatively low administrative costs. Since, in general, the funds 
are accessible upon any kind of separation, extensive monitoring is not needed. Additionally, 
the funds are deposited in individual accounts, in most cases in existent financial institutions, 
which also reduce managing costs. Again, the extent of this advantage depends on country 
specific factors. A system that combines UISAs with social insurance  may still have 
considerable monitoring costs. In addition, if benefits are contingent upon the type of 
dismissal, other costs, such as litigation costs, may have to be considered.
6
A final consideration with respect to UISAs involves the credibility of the institutions 
managing the funds. Because of the nature of the funds, workers regard them as relatively 
illiquid assets. In the presence of liquidity constraints, if the real return on the deposits is low, 
the valuation of the accumulated funds will be low as well and will diminish as the fund 
  It is worth 
mentioning that, since funds in unemployment accounts become pension funds upon 
retirement, UISAs may provide a foundation for developing individual pension plans. 
Although this aspect may not be apparent right now, given the small size of the balances 
generally held in these accounts, it may prove important in the face of growing concern about 
the sustainability of public pension funds. As an alternative to company pension plans, 
UISAs have the advantage of being fully portable (therefore, not restricting worker’s 
mobility) and not having higher administrative costs.  
                                                            
6 This is the case in Brazil. See Camargo (2002).    
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accumulates. In this event, the worker's valuation of the fund will be lower than the 
employer's cost of the payments, which provides incentives for informal agreements that may 
benefit both parties. Evidence of this behavior has been documented for Brazil where 
workers have incentives to provoke their own dismissal in order to access the fund (Gil et. 
al., 2000, and Barros, Corseuil and Foguel, 1999). This type of collusive behavior is difficult 
to anticipate. It may originate from the lack of credibility of the institutions that are managing 
the funds, but also from the severity of liquidity constraints for the covered population. The 
particular form of collusive behavior is also likely to be country specific, depending on the 
interaction of the UISA system with existing labor regulations. In this context, it is worth 
mentioning that other institutional factors may also affect the effectiveness of the system. 
One example is the case of Peru, where the government has authorized several withdrawals 
from the individual accounts for purposes other than unemployment protection.
7
                                                            
7 Peru, Decreto de Urgencia 67-2002 (to repay loans garanteed with CTS) and Decreto de Urgencia 19-2002 (to 
incentive domestic demand). 
 As a result, 
unemployment protection has become limited or even non-existent for those workers who 
decide to withdraw funds. Although these measures were deemed temporary, the Peruvian 
government is experiencing difficulties going back to the UISA system of mandatory 
savings, since workers have been enjoying a form of wage increase from the "temporary" 
measures that it is difficult to give up.   
  Overall, UISAs have the potential of overcoming some of the worst features of 
traditional systems of unemployment protection, reducing moral hazard, lowering 
administrative costs (with respect to unemployment insurance), reducing firing costs and 
avoiding firms' liquidity issues (with respect to severance payments). Theoretically, they are 
also likely to promote formal labor markets. However, the system needs to be upgraded with 
additional features if it is to provide adequate coverage. This, in turn, may limit the 
advantages mentioned before. The overall effect of UISAs depends on a vast array of specific 
country characteristics and program parameters. Examination of the existing UISA systems is 
a first step in this direction. By describing the experience of Latin American countries that 
use UISAs, we hope to offer light on the common problems of the system and suggest 
possible directions for future theoretical and empirical work.     
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2. Unemployment Insurance Savings Accounts in Latin America 
    Overview  
Offering an overview of UISA's in Latin America presents several challenges. It is 
often difficult to obtain comparable information on the performance of the institution under 
analysis. In the case of Latin America, some programs have been in place for a very short 
time (Chile, Ecuador) while others have more than ten years of history (Brazil, Colombia, 
Peru or Panama). In some countries, all dependent workers have the right to be covered by 
the system of individual accounts. Yet, in Argentina UISA's only cover construction workers. 
This variation across programs limits the amount of information available to researchers. 
Additionally, accounting methods also vary across countries, making comparisons more 
difficult. For instance, Brazil publishes only the number of active accounts, which may not 
correspond with the number of workers covered by the system, as accounts are linked to jobs 
rather than to individuals.  
We summarize the main characteristics of UISA's and some indicators of the 
performance of the funds in Tables 1 and 2.   
As mentioned, UISAs are mandatory savings schemes in which employers (and in the 
case of Chile, workers as well) contribute on a regular basis a fraction of the monthly wage 
towards a special individual account. In general, upon separation workers can access the 
totality of the funds. In all the cases examined here, the fund is available to the worker upon 
retirement or to the inheritors, in the case of death. Table 1 shows the main features of the 
UISAs in Latin America: the type of worker covered, the amount of contributions, requisites 
to access the funds, income protection benefits, other benefits derived from the funds, 
whether the system provides social insurance, and the type of institution that manages the 
funds. Most countries, except Argentina, Brazil and Peru, cover all dependent workers. 
Contributions are mostly made by employers and are generally around one month's wages 
per year, although they may range from one week's wages per year (Panama) to a maximum 
of 12% of the monthly wage in Argentina. In Chile the government makes contributions to 
the fund. Most countries allow employees to make voluntary contributions, whereas 
employee contributions are required in Chile. In terms of the pre-requisites to collect the    
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funds, some countries, like Brazil and Ecuador, make the payment conditional upon the type 
of separation. This restriction has the potential to increase monitoring and administrative 
costs (Camargo (2002)). It may also contribute to employer-employee collusive behavior 
regarding how separations are "labeled". Such behavior has been extensively documented for 
Brazil  (Barros, Corseuil and Foguel, 1999). In addition, Chile, Ecuador and Venezuela 
require a minimum of contributions or tenure in order to access the funds. Regarding the 
amounts available in case of job separation, most countries allow access to the total balance 
of the fund. However, Chile and Ecuador, which have a system closer to the original 
unemployment insurance saving account model, limit the benefits that can be collected at one 
given time. This feature further reduces the incentives for collusive behavior mentioned 
above at the cost of increasing administrative costs.  
  An additional issue concerning the adequacy of the benefits arises from the severity 
of liquidity constraints. Since UISAs may be imposing mandatory savings on a potentially 
credit constrained population with perverse effects on family expenditures and investments, 
most programs (except Chile, Ecuador and Venezuela) allow partial withdrawals from the 
fund to finance human capital investments and to pay for housing or health expenses. The 
effect that these “exceptions” have on the insurance role of the individual funds is yet to be 
examined. In Peru, for instance, the increased allowances of fund withdrawal are threatening 
the purpose of the severance fund as a source of income protection against unemployment.  
How good are UISAs in providing income protection in the event of unemployment? 
One of the main problems of a pure UISA system is that it forgoes the redistributive effects 
available with a system that pools the unemployment risks of all the working population. 
Because of the concentration of unemployment among certain groups of the population, 
UISAs may not provide adequate benefits for temporary workers or those with low incomes. 
This creates the problem of providing alternative sources of income for workers with 
insufficient funds in their accounts. Of all the countries, Chile is the only one that offers 
social protection within the individual account system, through the Solidary Fund. Ecuador is 
moving towards a system based only on individual accounts, but it is currently a mixed 
system, where part of the population still withdraws funds from a common pool. In other 
countries, additional income sources may be available from other programs.     
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Table 1. UISA Characteristics 
 
Country  Coverage  Contributions  Eligibility 

















Employers: 8% m. wage.   Contingent on 




allowed for housing or 
health expenses. 




** Employees: 0.6% m. 






1 m./year (up to 5 
m.) Decreasing 




guaranteed with the 
Solidarity Fund. (up 
to 2 withdrawals 
every 5 years) 
Recognized 







Employers: 9.3% m. 
wage.  
 





allowed. Funds can 
guarantee some house 
loans 
NO / Other Programs 
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Employer:1 m. wage / 





Min 48 deposits 
1 year tenure 
Balance upon 
separation / 3 
times the avg wage 
in previous year 
--  NO / Other Programs 
Recognized 






Employer:1 w. wage / 
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allowed for housing, 
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expenses  










Employers: 2 deposits of 












Employer: 5 d wage/ 
month. Increases with 
tenure. Max 30 d 
wage/year  
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** Minimum and maximum contributions 
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Table 2. Analysis of Funds  
 








Number of Accounts (Th.)  59,156   1,194 (active)
  2,679  --  191 
# Accounts / Employed 
2  2.18   0.22  0.16  --  0.17 
Fund Balance (Mill. US $) 
3  24,685  103  845,553  952  103 
Avg Balance (US$)  417  49  334  --  536 
Min. Monthly Wage (US$)  277 
4  24.7   208 
5  117.9  142 
6 
Net Deposits 
(Thousands US $)  932,602  110  (-11,505)  --  -- 
Withdrawals/ 
Deposits  87.6 %  7%  80.7 %  --  -- 
Average 
Withdrawal (US$) 
347  81  --  --  -- 
Rate of Return  3% (fixed)  3.33%  7.33% (min. 
guaranteed)  4.38%   Market rate 
7 
Costs/Commission  -  0.6%  4%  -  -- 
1.  Accounts represent jobs rather than individuals 
2.  Employment figures obtained from the Official Statistic 
Institute in each country. 
3.  Nominal dollars. 
4.  Average wage, 2001 information.  
5.    Average monthly income. Average Median income is 121 US$. 
6.    Minimum wage ranges from 142 to 273 US$ in the Panama/San  
      Miguelito region for 40 hour week.  
7.     Average interest rate on domestic deposits 5%    
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Another source of difference among countries relates to the administration of the 
funds. Most programs establish special financial institutions -- or create special regulations 
governing existing institutions -- whose sole function is the managing of the unemployment / 
severance fund. Other countries, like Argentina or Peru, allow the funds to be deposited in 
the regular banking system (and instead regulate the type of deposit). In Brazil the 
government operates the fund, while Panama gives the employer discretion about the choice 
of the managing institution. Venezuela has opted for a mixed system for the administration of 
the severance fund.  
  Table 2 offers a summary of the performance of the funds in different countries. As 
mentioned, some programs of very recent implementation have only limited or almost no 
information available (Ecuador and Chile). Other programs are limited (Argentina) and no 
information could be found on their operation. In some cases (Brazil), information on the 
number of beneficiaries is not available.  
  UISA's are relatively small programs in Latin America. The main exception is Chile, 
where after less than two years operating, 22% of the employed population has an active 
account. These figures fail to account for the extent of the informal economy. The average 
balance held in the individual accounts usually exceeds minimum monthly wages. However, 
this is a poor indicator of the performance of the funds in terms of income protection since, 
with the exception of Chile, no program guarantees minimum payments.  
The rest of this section offers a detailed review of the features and operation of the 
UISA systems currently in place in Latin America. It also goes on to analyzing some of the 
issues concerning the performance of UISA’s that have arisen in the context of different 
countries’ experience.  
Argentina  
Argentina has a form of UISA for construction workers. The Collective Bargaining 
Agreement for Construction Workers in Argentina (Convenio Colectivo de la Construccion 
76/75) refers to a "Fondo de Desempleo for the Construction Industry" (Unemployment Fund 
for Construction Industry). It establishes that employers must make monthly contributions of 
12% (in the first year) and 8% (in subsequent years) of the monthly wage. These    
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contributions are deposited in individual accounts in banking institutions and are, 
presumably, available to the worker upon separation of any kind. 
Brazil 
The FGTS (Fundo de Garantia de Tempo do Servicio) was established in 1967. The 
new Constitution of 1988 brought major changes to labor regulation and unemployment 
protection in Brazil. In particular, it established that contributions to the FGTS should be 
placed in individual accounts rather than into a common pool of resources. It also introduced 
changes in the penalty a firm must pay if it dismisses a worker without just cause. The two 
concepts are closely related because the penalty is set as a percentage of the value 
accumulated in the fund. In particular, the 1988 constitution set this penalty for dismissal 
without just cause from 10 to 40% of the amount accumulated in the worker's account during 
the length of the contract.
8
The fund is built with contributions from the employers that amount to 8% of the 
employee's monthly salary
 This amount was paid directly to the worker. Additionally, in 
2001, the government legislated additional social contributions to the fund in the case of 
dismissal without just cause. These include 10% of the deposits accumulated in the FGTS 
during the contract and 0.5 of the last monthly wage. The purpose of these contributions was 
to cover the deficit generated by a ruling of the Brazilian Supreme Tribunal of Justice that 
recognized the worker's right to a monetary adjustment on FGTS accounts between 1988 and 
1989. Therefore, these contributions -- although part of the Fund -- do not increase worker's 
accounts individually. 
9
•  Active Accounts are those that receive regular deposits and are associated with 
operating labor contracts.  
, roughly one month of pay per year of work. Individual accounts 
are associated with specific labor contracts. Therefore, there are as many accounts as labor 
contracts. These can be classified into two main groups:  
                                                            
8 See Paes de Barros, Corseuil and Bahia (1999) for a complete account of these constitutional changes to labor 
regulation. 
9 Temporary workers get a contribution of 2%. The severance penalty for dismissal for unjust cause is waived 
for temporary employees.     
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•  Inactive Accounts are those that do not receive regular deposits because of the 
termination of the labor contract under which they were established.  
The regulatory organ of the system is the "Conselho Curador", which consists of two 
employer representatives, two employee representatives and six government officials from 
various ministries. Its main function is to decide the allocation of the resources. The Ministry 
of Planification (MPO, Ministerio do Planejamiento e Orcamento) is the supervisor of the 
program and the CEF (Caixa Economica Federal) operates the fund. The Caixa also keeps a 
register of historic accounts to facilitate worker's information on all of his labor history.  
 
Table 3. FGTS, Number and Value of Accounts  
 
  Active Accounts   Inactive Accounts  












1999  48,005  63,286  -  17,858  2,623  - 
2000  54,271  67,121  1,237  9,379  1,316  140 
2001  59,156  73,767  1,247  9,584  1,338  140 
2002  63,632  80,799  1,270  4,976  757  152 
2004  55,184  99,277  1,799  646.8  350.0  541 
2006  55,043  125,765  2,285  15,088  3,854  255 
 
Source: FGTS Prestacâo de Contas Exercicio 2001, 2000; Relatorio de Gestão (2002, 2004, 2006) 
1 BRL = 0.6133  USD 
 
  Table 3 shows the evolution of the number, value and average balance of accounts 
with a positive balance. The number of active accounts increased by 15% between 1999 and 
2006, while the value of these accounts almost doubled during the same time period. The 
average balance in 2006 was 2,285 Brazil Reais (BRL), approximately 1,400 US$.  
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Upon dismissal without just cause, the worker can access 100% of the fund including 
any portion accumulated from previous jobs. However, the worker can also access the fund 
under the following circumstances: 
•  Indirect dismissal
10
•  Break-down of contract for reciprocal causes, unavoidable causes, or firm closure 
 
•  Termination of the labor contract  
•  Retirement (individuals older than 70 years of age have automatic access to the 
Fund), death, disability and specific health issues 
•  Inactive account for more than 3 years (unemployed or out of the labor force) 
•  House acquisition or financing of mortgage payments.   
Withdrawals for dismissal constitute around two-thirds of all fund removals, while 
housing withdrawals are approximately 15%. The composition of withdrawals has remained 
stable between 1999 and 2002, with a slight increase in the value of withdrawals associated 
with dismissals and a decline in the value of the withdrawals to finance the purchase of a 
house.  The Fund itself has been very active in the financing of housing or home 
improvement.  
  Between 1997 and 1999, the Fund experienced liquidity issues (see Figure 1). Part of 
it could be attributed to the rising unemployment rate experienced at the end of the decade. 
The year 2000 saw the beginning of a recovery that continued through the decade, lead by 
the fall of the unemployment rate and the efforts of the Caixa both to recover past credits and 
to increase the number of accounts.  
 
                                                            
10 Indirect dismissal refers to court requests initiated by the employee to be dismissed from his job claiming 
breach of the labor contract.     
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Traditionally, unemployment protection in Chile included an unemployment subsidy 
and severance pay. The first instrument covered workers dismissed for unjust cause and who 
had 12 months of contributions to any insurance system. This instrument had both low 
benefits, ranging from 12 to 25% of the minimum wage, over a maximum period of 12 
months,  and low coverage, 30% of the potential beneficiaries. The second instrument 
covered workers in the event of dismissal for economic reasons. The benefits were one 
month of wages per year of tenure with an alternative severance payment that could be 
negotiated after six years of tenure. This form of severance pay was closer in spirit to a UISA 
system but it covered only a small fraction of unemployed workers. In particular, it did not 
cover dismissal for reasons other than economic, including retirement, death, and voluntary 
quits. In addition, since 1991, a system of individual accounts has also been in place for 
domestic workers (Chilean Labour Code, art. 163-165). Dismissal for any reason entitled 
domestic workers to a severance payment for the value of the accumulated fund. Employers 
contributed 4.11% of the monthly wage to the domestic worker fund for a maximum of 
eleven years.     
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Since 2002, Chile has a new system of unemployment protection. The law regulating 
the current Chilean unemployment protection system was approved in 2001. The new system 
is based on a mixture of individual and public funds, funded by contributions from the 
employer, the employee and the government (See Figure 1).  The system covers all 
dependent workers, except domestic workers, apprentices, retired or minors. The funding 
comes from contributions from employees (0.6% of the average monthly remuneration over 
the last 12 months, with a ceiling around US$2,000 monthly) and employers (2.4% of the 
average monthly remuneration over the last 12 months, with a ceiling around US$2,000 
monthly). The employee contributions are limited to 132 months in each employment.
11
                                                            
11 Term or temporary workers do not have to incur personal contributions. The employer will cover 3% of the 
remuneration. These workers will withdraw all funds at the term of the contract. 
 The 
employer contributions can be deducted from payment of compensation for unjust or 
economic dismissal. The employer deducts and deposits employee's contributions plus part 
of his contribution (1.6% of monthly remuneration) in an "Individual Unemployment 
Account". There are penalties for failure to comply. The rest of the employer contribution 
(0.8%) is deposited in a Solidary or Common Unemployment Fund. The Government 
contributes to the Solidary Fund with an annually fixed amount of around US $8.8 million. In 
Individual 
Account 
 Solidarity Fund 
EMPLOYEE 
GOVERNMENT 






UNJUST CAUSE    
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case of unemployment, the individual will receive unemployment insurance from his 
individual account. Any reason for unemployment is valid, including dismissal for economic 
reasons, retirement, disability or voluntary quitting. This is not withstanding other 
compensations the worker may have a right to such as severance payments. The main 
characteristics of the payments are: 
o  Limited payments  
o  Decreasing benefits with ceilings and minimum benefits 
o  Requires at least 12 contributions before accessing any benefits.  
o  Benefits indexed annually. 
The length of the benefits depends on the worker's contributions, specifically one 
month of benefits for each 12 months of contributions, to a maximum of five months. In the 
case of voluntary or involuntary unemployment, withdrawals occur for up to 5 months, with 
the amount of benefits decreasing in time and the initial amount depending on the number of 
years of previous contributions. These payments stop if the individual initiates a new 
contract. The final withdrawal is for the balance in the individual's account. In the event of 
death, disability or retirement, withdrawals are for the balance. This system is in place for 
new contracts (after October 2001), but workers with previous contracts have the option to 
join.  
An important feature of the new system is that it guarantees a minimum amount of 
unemployment insurance (as defined by the table below) for workers with low income that 
have not accumulated enough resources in the individual accounts. To this effect, 0.8% of the 
employer contributions are deposited in a Solidary or Common Fund. Unemployed workers 
that satisfy the requirements (minimum contributions and involuntary unemployment) and 
have insufficient funds in their account can withdraw from the Common Fund. Payments 
stop if the worker is not actively looking for employment or rejects (without justified cause) 
employment with a wage 50% or more of his last wage. Payments from the Common Fund 
are a decreasing percentage of the average wage in the previous 12 months, with a minimum 
and a maximum amount, both decreasing in the length of unemployment. Individual 
withdrawals from this fund are limited to 2 every 5 years. Total withdrawals from the 
Common Fund are limited to 80% of the last monthly balance.    
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Table 4. Payments of the Chilean Unemployment Insurance 
Unemployment 








       
1º  65,000  50%  125,000 
2º  54,000  45%  112,500 
3º  46,000  40%  100,000 
4º  38,500  35%  87,500 
5º  30,000  30%  75,000 
Source: Seguro de Cesantia. Informe Tecnico. Santiago de Chile 
 
The administration of the funds is controlled by the Unemployment Fund 
Administrator (AFC). This entity won the management of the unemployment funds in public 
auctions for ten years. The seven existing pension funds administrators in Chile own the 
AFC. They are monitored by the Superintendence of the Pension Fund Administrators. The 
AFC is responsible for collecting and assigning the contributions to the Individual Accounts 
and the Common Fund, payment of benefits, investment of resources and customer services. 
The investment structure is regulated according to the norms that rule investments of Pension 
Funds. The AFC charges an annual commission of 0.6% on the funds balance (Acevedo, 
Eskenazi and Pages, 2006).
12
The new Chilean unemployment protection system combines various features of 
individual accounts programs with more traditional ones. First, it facilitates worker mobility 
and job matching because it offers protection from all forms of unemployment, including 
voluntary unemployment, retirement, disability, and death. This way the worker does not 
renounce better employment opportunities because of fear of losing previously accumulated 
benefits. Second, the system reduces the moral hazard problems typically associated with the 
   
                                                            
12 On august 2008, a new “Proyecto de Ley” modified the Chilean Unemployment Fund to increase coverage 
and introduce more flexibility in terms of requisites to access the funds. In addition the new Law allows for 
more flexibility in the administration of the Funds with view to increase its returns propia.    
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existence of unemployment insurance since the worker has to deplete his/her own resources 
before being able to access the Common Fund. Moreover, there are important restrictions 
that limit the access to this fund, as well as additional requirements regarding cause of 
unemployment and availability to work. At the same time, the system still offers some social 
insurance to workers with low income who may not have accumulated sufficient resources. 
Sehnbruch (2004) suggests that although the new system does offer better coverage than the 
previous system, it does not particularly benefit those in more need of income protection 
(those holding irregular, short term jobs). However, the Fund has been very successful. By 
the end of 2007, more than 5 million Chilean workers have joined the new insurance system 
(See Table 6). Of these, 40% are young workers (between 18 and 30 years of age), 48% are 
prime age workers (between 31 and 50 years of age) and 12% are mature workers. The value 
of the fund as of December 2007 The real interest rate has stayed around 3% during 2002. 
The real interest rate has stayed around 3% during 2002.  is estimated over 1,6 billion US$, 
of which the Solidarity Fund accounts for 22%, almost doubling its participation since 2003. 
Moreover, in terms of the stability of contributions, around 60% of the affiliates hold 
indefinite work contracts. Therefore, the evolution of the Fund so far strengthens its role as a 
source of social insurance. The real interest rate has stayed around 3% during 2002.  
 
Table 5. The Chilean Unemployment Fund  
 
  Affiliates 
(Millions) 
Value 
(Th. Chilean Pesos) 
Value Solidarity Fund 
(%) 
       
2003  2.2  71,481  11% 
2004  3.2  181,533  16% 
2005  4.0  333,911  19% 
2006  4.7  548,914  21% 
2007  5.3  837,581  22% 
       
Source: Estados Financieros Fondo de Cesantia. AFC http://www.safp.cl/safpstats/stats/ 
1 CLP = 0.00192448 US$ 
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Colombia 
The Law 50 of 1990 introduced several reforms to the Colombian Labor Code. One 
of these involved switching from a traditional system of severance payments to one that 
required the creation of individual reserve funds. The traditional system had several 
disadvantages. The employer handled the severance fund on which he was required to offer 
an annual interest rate of 12%. However, since the employer was not required to generate or 
maintain enough reserves for the event of group dismissals, it was often the case that there 
were insufficient funds to make the severance payments. Under the new system, the 
employer deposits into the individual reserve fund an amount equivalent to one month of 
salary per year of work (9.3% of the annual salary). Payment must be settled annually and the 
fine for those employers who fail to comply with the regulation is equivalent to 12% of the 
severance payment. Workers with contracts under the previous legislation could switch to the 
new system.  
  Withdrawals for the total amount in the fund are made upon termination of the 
contract or retirement. In addition, partial withdrawals are allowed under the following 
circumstances: 
•  To finance their education or that of a family member. In this case the necessary 
amount will be deposited directly by the SAFC into the educational institution. 
•  To acquire, improve or release mortgage of a house. 
•  To pay the affiliate’s valuation property tax.  
•  The funds can also be pledged to guarantee house loans granted by worker’s funds 
and cooperatives.  
The workers may choose any of the existing Sociedades Administradoras de los 
Fondos de Cesantia (SAFC) or Severance Pay Funds Administrators as depositary of their 
funds. These are financial institutions, supervised by the Banking Superintendence, whose 
exclusive purpose is the administration and handling of severance pay. The SAFC's charge 
4% commission for expenses and are required to maintain a solvency margin and to 
guarantee a return of at least the average return on 3-month treasury bonds. These SAFC are 
monitored by the Juntas Directivas, which have representatives of both the workers and    
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employers. Investments must be made in accordance with the conditions and limits 
established by the Banking Superintendence (see Figure 3). 











SOURCE: Informes de Coyuntura. Boletin Mensual Superintendencia Bancaria. Colombia 
 
At the end of 2007, almost 4 million workers belonged to the fund. This number has 
been steadily increasing over the first decade, remaining around 4 million since 2004. Most 
of the workers affiliated to the Fund (70%) earn less than two times the minimum wage. The 
value of the Severance Pay Fund has been increasing over the last several years. 
Contributions rose considerably during 2002. This was interpreted as a sign of the recovery 
of the labor market in Colombia, particularly the formal sector. In general, withdrawals are 
greater than new deposits. However, the liquidity of the fund has not been compromised 
thanks to the payment of the returns, the sum of new deposits plus returns always being 




 The real interest rate has stayed around 3% during 2002, while the 
nominal rates of return for the Colombian Fund have been declining since 1995. (See Table 
6) 
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Table 6. Evolution of the Colombian Fund  
  Value of the Fund  Contributors  2 year return  
    Total  Voluntary  Nominal  Real 
  (Millions of COP)  (Thousands)  (%)  (%)  (%) 
           
1994  352  1,165    --   
1996  703  1,689    --   
1998  1,250  1,968  12%  25%  6.5% 
2000  1,865  2,274  28%  17%  6.2% 
2002  2,410  2,679  61%  13%  5.5% 
2004  4,287  2,996  48%  13%  6.4% 
2006  3,740  3,711  --  16%  11% 
2007  3,802  3,984  --  --  -- 
  Source: Informes de Coyuntura - Banking Superintendence Colombia 
1COP =  0.000526039 US$ 
 
Ecuador 
Since November of 2001, Ecuador has a new Social Security Law. The Law regulates 
a comprehensive social insurance, Mandatory General Insurance (SGO). The SGO includes 
health, disability, retirement and death, with special provisions for rural/agricultural 
communities. Contributions to the SGO vary by economic sector, but for most workers 
amounts to 20.5% of the monthly wage (11.15% from the employer and 9.35% from the 
employees). 
The regulatory organ of the General Insurance is the Instituto Ecuatoriano de 
Seguridad Social (IESS). It collects the contributions and controls compliance with the law in 
matters of social  security. Within the SGO, there are two varieties of unemployment 
insurance program. Individuals 40 years of age or younger (and those between 40 and 49 that 
choose to register), and new workers are covered by the new individual account system. 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
13 During the last year they seem to have experienced some difficulty. Nevertheless, returns are always over the 
minimum set up by the Banking Superintendence.     
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Other workers are covered under the old system of intergenerational insurance. The employer 
contributes with the equivalent of one month's wages per year to an individual account or 
"Fondo de Reserva" (Reserve Fund). Workers with more than one year of tenure and who are 
(involuntarily) unemployed have a right to income protection in case of involuntary 
unemployment. The worker must have a balance equivalent to 48 monthly contributions in 
the individual account. The amount available is three times the regular monthly wage 
(averaged over the previous year). In case of retirement, disability or death, the balance 
accumulated in the individual account will be fully accessible to the workers or his/her 
inheritors. Workers that are not covered under this program can draw UI benefits under the 
previous law. 
14 
Mandatory savings funds are administered by Provisional Savings Managing 
Institutions (EDAP's) under the supervision of the Banking Superintendence. The EDAP's 
also administer the individual Reserve Fund and can offer loans against the amount in the 
individual Reserve Fund. In 2003 there were around 1.2 million affiliated workers, half of 
these under fifty years of age. The latest report from the Banking Superintendency, values the 
unemployment fund at 1.4 billion $, with a rate of return of 7.5%.  
Panama 
Workers in Panama are entitled to a severance payment of one week's wages per year 
worked, payable at the end of the labor contract. The employer also has to offer the worker 
compensation in the case of dismissal without just cause, if the worker leaves the job for 
justified causes (included economic reasons) or if the labor contract ends of mutual accord. 
This compensation varies with the worker's tenure according to the scale provided below. 
Prior to 1972, the Labor Code established that these payments were a liability of the 
firm, but it left the management of it to the employer. This created the usual moral hazard 
problem for the firms described above, leading to bankruptcy and liquidity problems in the 
                                                            
14 Those workers access a common fund in the event of unemployment if they have a mimum of 60 non-
consecutive contributions to the SGO and after a waiting period of 90 days 
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case of substantial dismissals. After the new Labor Code became effective in 1972, the 
employer is required to deposit each trimester the corresponding fraction of the worker's 
severance payment, plus 5% of the corresponding amount he would collect in the case the 
contract terminates, in a trust fund with a private financial institution (slightly over 80% of 
the unemployment fund). Therefore, this part of the fund constitutes a system of individual 
unemployment accounts, in the sense that the amount is locked in for the workers and cannot 
be used by the employer. In addition, the worker may make individual contributions to the 
fund, deposited in a private account, but these are not a substantial part of the fund. The fund 
can be used as a guarantee for loans destined for the purchase of a house.  
 
Table 7. Panama's table of payments 
Tenure  Old Contracts  New contracts 
  Work before 1972*  Work after 1972   
       
Less than 1 year  1 week / 3 months  1 week / 3 months 
3.4 weeks / year 
1 to 2 years  1 week / 2 months  1 week / 2 months 
2 to 5 years  3 months 
3 addl. Weeks / year 
5 to 10 years  4 months 
10 to 15 years  5 months 
1 addl. Week / year  1 week / year  15 to 20 years  6 months 
More than 20 years  7 months 
       
Source: Panama's Labor Code (1972) 
 
There is no particular institution in charge of managing the severance pay. The 
employer establishes the trust fund with an approved financial institution of his/her choice. 
Banks, insurance companies, law firms, and other types of firms can apply to become a 
depositary of these unemployment funds/trusts, although the majority of them, around 60%, 
are banks. However, other types of firms serve most of the workers. The financial institutions 
in charge of the unemployment trusts offer the market rate of return on the funds; Figure 4    
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shows the evolution of the rate of returns on the funds help by each type of management 
firm.  
                     Table 8. Composition of Panama’s Unemployment Fund 
 
Accounts 
(thousands of Balboas)  2001  2003  2005  2007 
         
Tenure Fund  81,041  111,435  124,476  144,438 
Unjust Cause Compensation  11,356  10,846  17,425  21,779 
Voluntary Contributions  544  322  316  146 
Sub – Total  92,941  122,603  142,218  166,363 
Available to Employer  21,553  17,932  30,283  55,634 
Total   114,494  140,535  172,501  221,997 
Agents (Number)         
 Employers  3,321  2,833  2,725  2,704 
 Employees  194,602  179,438  213,297  248,433 
 Managing Institutions  20  17  14  11 
         
Source:  Banking Superintendency of Panama  
(1 BALBOA = 1.00000 US $) 
 
 









2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Year
%
Banks Firms Law firms
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Peru 
In Peru significant labor reforms started in 1991. Prior to this date, the Peruvian 
Labor Code established a very rigid labor market. What used to be a tenure bonus became the 
CTS (Compensacion por Tiempo de Servicio, Decreto Legislativo n.650). The text of the 
Law establishes the CTS as an individual fund to be financed by the employer with a deposit 
equivalent to 0.5 of the monthly salary payable every six months (deposited in May and 
December). The system only covers private employees not covered by other special regimes. 
The worker can choose the financial institution where he wants his fund deposited. 
Employers and employees can make private arrangements under which the employer 
becomes responsible for the deposit.  
In general, withdrawal of the funds requires proof of dismissal. Originally, however, 
workers could withdraw 50% of the funds in the case of an emergency. They could also use 
up to 50% of the funds as guarantee of employer’s loans or loans from credit unions and 
savings cooperatives. Nevertheless, the government has authorized additional withdrawals on 
occasion. For instance, last December, through a Decreto de Urgencia 67-2002, the 
government authorized the withdrawal of 100% of the funds to cancel loans and debts 
incurred with financial institutions. Earlier that year, the Decreto de Urgencia 19-2002 had 
allowed workers to withdraw the full amount of the deposit made between May and October 
2002 to “stimulate domestic demand”. These allowances have continued during 2003 and 
2004 and ended in January 2005. 
According to the Banking Superintendence, on December 2007, there were over two 
million CTS deposits valued at 4,769 thousand Peruvian soles (around 1,615 million US$). 
Most of these accounts (98%) are small - for amounts less than 20,000 Peruvian soles - 
representing only 54% of the value of the fund. The majority of the deposits are within the 
banking system (93%) while the rest are deposited in Savings Cooperatives. Deposits into the 
savings cooperatives grew at a much faster rate than deposits into the banking system due to 
the payment of higher interest rates.
15 
16
                                                            
15 The CTS amounts deposited in the banking system rose by  3% over the last year, whereas CTS amounts 
deposited with municipal savings cooperatives rose by 80%. Association Peruana de Consumidores y Usuarios. 
Boletin de Noticias, August 29, 2008. http://www.aspec.org.pe/ 
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Uruguay 
Although, strictly speaking, Uruguay does not have a system of individual accounts 
for unemployment insurance purposes, we will briefly refer to it because they have the 
necessary infrastructure (individual accounts) to implement such a system with relative ease. 
As in Ecuador, the Banco de Prevision Social administers a comprehensive social insurance 
program that includes medical, life, retirement, disability and unemployment. Approximately 
one half (7.47%) of the total employee contributions (15%) is deposited in a private account. 
Employers contribute an additional 12.5% of payroll and the government finances any deficit 
from tax revenue. This individual account can only be accessed in the event of retirement, 
permanent/transitory disability or death. The current unemployment protection system in 





Venezuela’s Labor Code dates from 1997. Workers (after 3 months of service) have 
the right to a severance package equivalent to 5 days of pay per month worked. There is an 
additional 2 days of pay per year after the first year up to a maximum of 30 days. The worker 
may choose one of the following three forms of receiving the severance fund: either as an 
individual account, as an individual trust fund, or as an individual account registered in the 
firm's accounting records. The employer makes monthly deposits into the selected type of 
account. The return on the trust funds or individual accounts deposited in financial 
institutions is the market rate. For funds deposited with the firm, the employer has to pay the 
average rate established by the Central Bank. If the employer fails to make these deposits (to 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
16 Banks pay, on average 4,5% (on accounts held in soles) or 2.29% (on accounts held in dólares), whereas 
savings cooperatives pay 11% (on accounts held in soles) y 4.5% (on accounts held in dólares). La Republica – 
on line August 29, 2008 http://www.larepublica.com.pe/content/view/220336/484/ 
17 UI in Uruguay covers employees from the private sector who had been (formally) employed for at least 6 
months during the 12 months prior to becoming unemployed. For workers receiving dayly or hourly wages, the 
requirement is to compute 150 of these wages or 6 minimum wages during the period. Qualified unemployed 
workers receive 50% of the average (over the last six months) monthly wages for a maximum period of six 
months. Refusal of available work without legitimate cause ends unemployment assistance. 
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deposit the funds as requested by the employee), he has to pay a rate on the amount owed 
(not deposited as requested) determined by the Central Bank.  
The fund is available to the worker upon termination of the contract, although access 
is granted to the annual returns yielded by the deposit. The worker has also the right to 
advance notification of dismissal, ranging from one week (after one month's tenure) to 1 
month (after one year's tenure). If the employer omits the advance notification, he will pay 
the corresponding amount of salary at the time of dismissal.  
As it is often the case with other UISA systems, partial withdrawals are allowed to 
finance certain investments. In this case, an employee can obtain a loan of up to 75% of 
his/her severance fund to pay for the purchase or financing of a home, his/her education or 
that of a family member or the individual's or the family's health expenses.  
Performance of UISA’s 
This section highlights some issues that have arisen in the context of different 
countries’ individual experiences with UISA’s.   
In countries where the system has been in place long enough to observe meaningful 
trends, the performance of the funds has been volatile, reflecting the instability of Latin 
American financial markets.  This problem has been particularly acute in Brazil. The FGTS 
has been poorly managed by the government. Initially, the government guaranteed an interest 
rate on the accumulated funds to maintain the real value of the Fund. These interest rates 
were dependent on the length of the labor relationship and varied from 3% for employees 
with tenure of less than two years, to 6% for employees with more than ten years of tenure. 
During the 1970's various regulations influenced these interest rates, which were finally 
reduced to 3% for all deposits initiated after 1970. These changes complicate the calculation 
of the return on individual deposits, since deposits made at different times and for individuals 
with different tenures will have different associated interest rates. Exploration of the returns 
on the deposits involves two  main issues. On the one hand, hyperinflation has made it 
difficult to maintain the real value of the funds. The biggest real losses occurred between 
1968 and 1979, when deposits initiated with a nominal interest rate of 3% depreciated over    
29   
40%. Only during the first half of the 1990's were the returns on FGTS accounts enough to 
compensate for inflation for all account types. On the other hand, the rate of return on the 
fund also compares poorly with alternative assets. Because the deposits to the Fund constitute 
a form of forced savings, the returns on these deposits should be compared to those of 
alternative saving instruments, namely saving accounts. Again, only recent deposits (those 
initiated between 1995 and 1998) have experienced a gain relative to saving accounts 
(Oliveira, Beltrao, Pasinato and Guerra, 1999).  
In other countries, like Colombia, the performance of the Severance Fund has been 
steadily improving over the 1990s. However, with the exception of Brazil, there are no 
studies comparing the returns on UISA's with other financial assets.  
An additional problem arising from poor fund management and low rates of return on 
deposits is that, in the presence of liquidity constraints, it creates strong incentives for the 
worker to try to access the fund. Barros, Corseuil and Foguel (1999) provide some evidence 
of the existence of collusive behavior between workers and firms to "label" voluntary quits as 
dismissals.
18
                                                            
18 The firm dismisses the worker, granting him access to the funds, and the worker renounces the penalty. This 
type of collusive behavior has become more difficult with the creation of additional penalties for firms in the 
case of dismissal without just cause, which have to be paid to a common pool and therefore, cannot be 
"returned" by the employee. 
 In general, these incentives will create higher rates of turnover in the labor 
market than would otherwise be observed. It is difficult to asses to what extent this is a 
problem arising from the particular characteristics of the Brazilian Fund or the general 
performance of the economy or a combination of both. One plausible reason could be that 
Brazil is the only country, among those offering the unemployment insurance individual 
savings account system, which makes payment contingent on the type of dismissal, thus 
creating incentives for this type of collusive behaviour. Yet, the existing structure of the 
penalty for unjust dismissal in Brazil may be an element affecting (or reinforcing) these 
incentives. Another possibility is that Brazilian workers may have faced particularly severe 
credit constraints and therefore had particularly powerful incentives to engage in this 
collusive behaviour. Yet another explanation involves the poor management of the fund, 
which earned negative real returns for considerable periods of time. Most likely a 
combination of all of the above shaped this particular effect of unemployment insurance    
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individual savings accounts in Brazil. Therefore, to draw the conclusion that this type of 
collusion will not persist if, for instance, the fund were made accessible to the worker upon 
any type of separation might not be correct. Moreover, some of these problems might have 
different effects in different countries. For instance, credit constraints may generate enough 
political pressure for the government to allow additional withdrawals from the fund for 
reasons other than unemployment, as it is the case in Peru.  
Studies regarding the Brazilian case show that regarding the adequacy of income 
protection, UISA’s do not fare well. Relative to the minimum monthly wage, the distribution 
of the balances shown in Table 3 reveals that 56% of the active accounts have balances that 
are less than the minimum wage, while 1.5% of the active accounts have balances that 
exceed one hundred times the minimum wage (around 38% of the total balance of active 
accounts).
19
Moving from a system of severance pay to a system of individual accounts is 
relatively easy in terms of the necessary administrative infrastructure, as the Panama case 
showed. However, this change highlighted an additional issue that has received some 
attention in the literature on UISA’s, namely that such moving may have an effect on wages. 
In particular, it opens the possibility that workers and firms respond to the new system by 
negotiating lower wages to compensate for the distortionary effects of severance pay 
regulation. This was not possible under the traditional system because of the firm's moral 
hazard problem. Kugler (2001) finds evidence suggesting that this is indeed the case. At the 
same time, Kugler's results suggest that the insurance role of the new severance payment 
  Furthermore, although the fund is the most importance source of income 
protection for unemployed workers, particularly those with some tenure, the breadth of the 
coverage  --  in particular the coverage of the low-income population --  is not high. The 
majority of the FGTS' beneficiaries are above the 50-th percentile of the income distribution 
(Barros, Courseil and Foguel (2001)).  This could be a consequence of the combination of 
poor performance of the Funds mentioned above that forces workers to try to access their 
accounts as often as possible to avoid important loses in the purchasing power of their 
savings.  
                                                            
19 See Carneiro (2003), Barros, Courseil and Foguel (2001)    
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system is very limited and that the individual account system has important effects in 
increasing turnover rates.  
The revision of the UISA systems that exist in Latin America reveal that, in general, 
they increase the flexibility of the labour market without imposing the same high 
administrative costs and moral hazard problems of traditional Unemployment Insurance 
systems. The study of individual cases also shows, however, that they pose problems of their 
own. On of the most important is that they do not seem to be a good source of unemployment 
protection in the presence of severe liquidity constraints or deficient financial management.  
3. Conclusion 
This paper provides an overview and assessment of the basic features of UISAs in Latin 
America. Unemployment insurance saving accounts provide an alternative to traditional 
systems of unemployment insurance, one that seems particularly suitable for developing 
countries. Their main potential advantages are: 
•  UISA’s reduce the moral hazard problems associated with the traditional systems, 
both on the part of the worker and on the part of the firm. They provide the adequate 
incentives for workers to return to work and for firms to comply with the payments 
for dismissal.  
•  UISA’s have the potential to promote flexibility in the labour market (it facilitates 
worker mobility and job matching). 
•  A system of individual accounts is, in principle, less expensive to implement than 
unemployment insurance. In addition the transition from most of the actual systems 
of severance payment seems relatively easy in terms of infrastructure. 
•  A major caveat is that it is not yet well understood whether or not these programs 
offer adequate income protection. Evidence suggests that this form of income 
protection for the unemployed should be complemented with additional forms of 
insurance.  
The main conclusion from this study is that UISAs seem particularly well suited for 
developing economies and economies in transition, but with the understanding that 
assessment of its effects ought to be guided by country specific studies. A key lesson learned    
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from examination of the existent UISAs in Latin America is that any assessment of its effects 
requires careful country specific analysis. Even when the model implemented in most 
countries has the same basic features, namely a system of unemployment insurance 
premiums regularly deposited into individual accounts, it is difficult to extract general 
conclusions as to its consequences for labour markets. This may be partly because of small 
differences in implementation, but it may also be due to each country’s idiosyncrasies.  
  In identifying the direction of further research, the particular political and institutional 
environment of the countries should be taken into account. Ideally, we seek to understand 
whether differences across countries in the outcomes of UISAs are due to differences in 
program design and implementation or due to differences in the economies and institutions of 
these countries. Individual country studies therefore, will enable us to see if any general 
patterns emerge. In addition, despite researcher's efforts, data are not very comparable across 
countries, which makes country-specific research more effective than cross-country studies. 
  One of the most pressing matters for research is the ability of UISAs to provide 
adequate income protection. For some countries, where the extent of the informal or 
“underground” economy is abnormally large, this implies paying particular attention to the 
effects of UISAs on the creation of formal employment or to the potential that exists for the 
administrators of the fund to extract rents from either employers or employees. For other 
countries, this may be a lesser issue. Other matters, such as ascertaining whether UISAs are 
contributing to increasing inequality by eliminating the role of social insurance in protecting 
against unemployment risk, might be more relevant for them. In any of these cases, we ought 
to consider the alternative income protection programs that are available in each country.  
Additionally, the labor market effects of implementing UISA’s should be more 
thoroughly examined. Particularly important,  although a difficult task by nature, is to 
understand the effects of UISA’s on the extent of the informal economy. In addition, the 
problem of collusive behavior between firms and workers to reduce wages should be 
considered.  
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One of the objectives of this paper is to summarize the basic features of UISA systems and 
examine evidence relating to the performance of these arrangements. This type of assessment 
can help to identify desirable directions for reform. While such identification may be 
necessary to bring about change, it is typically not sufficient. Political constraints often make 
it difficult to move in the desired directions, even when there is general agreement on the 
problems associated with the current system. 
  Overall, UISAs have the potential  of overcoming some of the worst features of 
traditional systems of unemployment protection, reducing moral hazard, lowering 
administrative costs (with respect to unemployment insurance), reducing firing costs and 
avoiding firms' liquidity issues (with respect to severance payments). Theoretically, they are 
also likely to promote formal labor markets. However, the system needs to be upgraded with 
additional features if it is to provide adequate coverage. This, in turn, may limit the 
advantages mentioned before. The overall effect of UISAs, thus, depends on a vast array of 
specific country characteristics and program parameters. This calls for individualized studies 
that address the particularities of each country when assessing or evaluating the performance 
of UISAs.     
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